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A DEFINITION THAT DOES NOTWORK: THE IMPACT OF THE EU
FRAMEWORK DECISION ON THE FIGHT AGAINST ORGANIZED
CRIME
FRANCESCO CALDERONI*
1. Introduction
The deadline for the implementation of Council Framework Decision
2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organized crime
(hereinafter the FD) was 11 May 2010.1 By 11 November 2012, the Council,
based on a report drafted by the Commission, should “assess the extent to
which Member States have complied with the provisions of this Framework
Decision” (Art. 10 of the FD). Given this timeline, the forthcoming months,
with the publication of the Commission report and the Council’s assessment
of the FD, will be extremely important for the future of EU policy against
organized crime.
The analysis of this particular field of EU action is relevant since there
seems to be a contrast between the high expectations of EU citizens and the
quality of EUmeasures in the area. Indeed, while surveys repeatedly show that
European citizens are supportive of strong EU intervention in the fight against
organized crime,2 academics and policy makers have criticized the FD.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, to date the EU has not yet conducted a study
on the impact and effectiveness of the FD. While the Commission should
produce a report on the implementation of the FD in 2012, previous
experience suggests that the Commission’s report may be based only on the
(frequently limited) information provided by the Member States.
* Assistant Professor at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore of Milan and researcher at
Transcrime, Italy. francesco.calderoni@unicatt.it
1. O.J. 2008, L. 300/42.
2. Commission, Opinions on organized, cross-border crime and corruption: Summary,
Special Eurobarometer 245; “Press Release RAPID. The majority of EU citizens consider that
more decision-making should take place at EU level in justice and home affairs policy areas.”,
MEMO/08/470, 2 July 2008 <europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
MEMO/08/470&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> accessed 29
Dec. 2011.
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This article analyses the impact of the FD, updating a previous study which
evaluated the impact of this legal instrument at the moment of its entry into
force.3
The main goal is to demonstrate that the FD “does not work”, i.e. that a) its
provisions are so vague that most EU Member States do not need to change
their national legislation to be formally compliant with it and b) the FD does
not address the relevant inconsistencies between laws on organized crime. Just
as Paoli discussed the paradoxes of organized crime, it appears legitimate to
argue that there is a “paradox of the approximation of organized crime
legislation”:4 the high compliance of national legislationwith the FD is not the
outcome of high levels of approximation; on the contrary, it is the consequence
of excessively broad EU requirements hiding the strong discrepancies among
national provisions. The paradox results in an approximation en trompe l’oeil,
where EU intervention has only formally made national laws equivalent,
without promoting any improvement in their consistency.
The paradox of the approximation of organized crime legislation may have
direct implications for European citizens. The introduction of broad
definitions and offences may infringe upon the basic principles of criminal
law and even end up in an over-expansion of criminal law restricting civil
rights and freedoms.
This article may also be interesting for the study of the evolution of the EU
Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon.5 Indeed, the FD is just one example of EU policy-making in
the AFSJ. This has frequently been criticized for its lack of transparency,
democratic accountability and effectiveness. The forthcoming developments
concerning the FD will also signal whether the new institutional framework
will bring any improvement to the quality of EU policies. Eventually, this
study may contribute to the forthcoming evaluations of the FD by the EU
institutions and further encourage the debate about the future development of
EU policies in this area and more generally in the AFSJ.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short background
to the EU policies of approximation of criminal law and a synthesis of the
main problems of the FD. Section 3 provides an overview of existing national
legislation on organized crime among EU Member States and assesses the
3. Calderoni, Organized crime legislation in the European Union: Harmonization and
Approximation of Criminal Law, National Legislations and the EU Framework Decision on the
Fight Against Organized Crime (Springer, 2010).
4. See Paoli, “The paradoxes of organized crime”, 37 Crime, Law and Social Change
(2002), 51–97.
5. Since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, 1 Dec. 2009 and abolished the pillars
division, the Area of Freedoms Security and Justice (AFSJ) is now very similar to other EU
policies.
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impact of the FD, demonstrating that this measure has not brought significant
changes in the EU Member States, but also that it may result in unwarranted
expansion of the scope of the organized crime laws. Section 4 concludes by
arguing the possible future developments of EU policy on organized crime.
2. The EU policy in approximating organized crime legislation
2.1. Approximation of criminal law in the EU
Since its creation, the EU has had a vocation to influence the criminal
legislation of the Member States. First, the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992
opened the possibility for EU intervention in criminal matters with the
creation of the so-called Third Pillar of the Treaty on European Union,
although with no explicit mention of any direct influence on criminal laws.
Second, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced for the first time the concept of
approximation of criminal law in the Third Pillar, although with a very
restrictive approach.6 The Third Pillar maintained this framework for more
than ten years until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
In general, EU policies in the field of the approximation of criminal law
faced a number of problems.
The first problem had to do with the political desirability of a strong EU
influence on national criminal legislation. For years, the competence of the
European Community in criminal matters was excluded from theTreaties and
very limited by the European jurisprudence.7 Even with the creation of the
6. A new concept within the Third Pillar, approximation is different from harmonization
and can be defined as the process of modifying different criminal legislations in order to
eliminate differences contrasting with the minimum standard set by a European legal measure;
see Calderoni, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 4. The specific instrument for the approximation was the
framework decision which was “binding upon theMember States as to the result to be achieved
but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods” (Art. 34 (2)(b) TEU
Amsterdam). However, the literature pointed out that the binding effect was rather weak. See
Bernardi, “Le rôle du troisième pilier dans l’européanisation du droit pénal: Un bilan
synthétique à la veille de la réforme des traitées”, (2007) Revue de Science Criminelle et de
Droit Pénal Comparé, 713, 722–723; Fletcher, Lööf, andGilmore,EUCriminal law and justice
(Edward Elgar 2008), pp. 35 and 71; Mitsilegas, EU Criminal law (Hart Publishing 2009), p.
18; Obokata, “Key EU principles to combat transnational organized crime”, 48 CML Rev.
(2011), 801, 808.
7. Only in 2005 did the case law open the way to EC competence in criminal matters (see
Case C-176/03,Commission v.Council, [2005] ECR I-7879, for the environmental crimes case
and Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council, [2007] ECR I-9097 for ship-source pollution) and
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 finally enabled the approximation of
criminal law that is necessary for the support of other EU policies (Art. 83 (2) TFEU). See
Spencer, “Why is the harmonisation of penal law necessary?” in Klip and Van der Wilt (Eds.),
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Third Pillar, EU influencewas circumscribed by the concept of approximation
of criminal law, which was narrowly, if ever, defined.8 Early efforts of
approximation, backed by enthusiasm for the development of a common
European criminal area, were soon faced with the narrow scope provided by
the Treaties and with the reactions by policymakers and researchers.9 In
particular, national policymakers soon limited the scope of approximation of
criminal law. The Tampere European Council of October 1999 introduced the
principle of mutual recognition as the cornerstone of the EU policies in
the Third Pillar, notwithstanding the absence of any explicit mention of the
principle in the Treaties.10 Concerning scholars’ reactions, they showed
Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal law (Royal Netherlands Academy of
Science, 2002);Vogel, “Why is the harmonisation of penal law necessary?AComment” in Klip
andVan derWilt, ibid.; See Bernardi, op. cit. supra note 6; Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note 6, pp.
65–84; Fletcher, Lööf, and Gilmore, op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 176–184.
8. Calderoni, op. cit. supra note 3.
9. An interesting example of the harmonization effort was the Corpus Juris Project, which
produced an ambitious proposal to improve the fight against EC budget frauds. It suggested the
adoption of a common core of EC offences and criminal procedure rules, including a European
Public Prosecutor office. See Delmas-Marty (Ed.), Corpus juris: portant dispositions pénales
pour la protection des intérêts financiers de l’Union européenne = introducing penal provisions
for the purpose of the financial interests of the European Union (Economica, 1997);
Delmas-Marty and Vervaele (Eds.), The implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member
States: Penal Provisions for the protection of European Finances (Intersentia, 2000). The
Commissionwas supportive of this approach, although it acknowledged the lack of a legal basis
in the Treaties; See Commission, “Additional Commission contribution to the
Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reforms. The criminal protection of the
Community’s financial interests: a European Prosecutor”, COM(2000)608 final. It also drafted
a Green Paper suggesting future developments in this area: “Green Paper on criminal-law
protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European
Prosecutor COM(2001)715 final”. However, the Commission decided not to table a proposal
and the Member States did not endorse the idea; see Joutsen, The European Union and
Cooperation in Criminal Matters: the Search for Balance, vol. 25 (HEUNI, 2006),
<www.heuni.fi/uploads/gg29d0zcr1rpk_1.pdf> . The possibility of establishing a European
Public Prosecutor was however inserted in Art. 86 TFEU. Recently, DG JUSTICE of the
Commission has commissioned a feasibility study on the creation of an European Public
Prosecution Office from Eurojust (see European Union, “Service contract – 113038-2011 –
TED Tenders Electronic Daily”, 2011 <ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:113038-2011:
TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1> accessed 2 Jan. 2012).
The Corpus Juris is interesting for the analysis of organized crime legislation as it provided a
definition of conspiracy/criminal association (the name changed in the translations in different
languages). The Corpus Juris opted for the continental/civil law model. See Manacorda, “La
parabole de l’harmonisation pénale: à propos des dynamiques d’intégration normative relatives
à l’organisation criminelle” in Delmas-Marty and others (Eds.), Les chemins de
l’harmonisation pénale: Harmonising criminal law (Société de législation comparée, 2008),
pp. 282–283.
10. The principle of mutual recognition implies that judicial decisions in criminal matters
issued by aMember State are enforced by otherMembers States with no orminimum validation
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scepticism about projects tending towards the unification of national criminal
legislation, arguing that unification “must be viewed as an ideological option
instead of a need”.11 As a result of the reception by policymakers and
academics, approximation of criminal legislation in the EU has basically been
confined to support for the implementation of mutual recognition.12
The second problem was the low quality of most legal instruments of
approximation, due to different factors. First, the institutional framework of
the Third Pillar required the unanimity of EUMember States for the adoption
of a framework decision. This mechanism generated long negotiations and
difficulties in achieving a consensus, also considering that the process of
enlargement of the EU brought the number of Member States from 12 to 27 in
15 years. Inevitably, the legal measures adopted within the Third Pillar were
the result of complex compromises among the different Member States. As a
consequence, the significance of the measures was significantly watered
down. EU policymaking in this area often ended up in the adoption of
“minimum common denominator” instruments, with mostMember States not
needing to amend their national legislation to comply with EU standards.13
The second factor was that there was no agreed process for the selection of the
sectors to be approximated. Most often, they were decided in reaction to
particular sensational events. EU approximation was most driven by the need
procedures. See Kerchove and Weyembergh (Eds.), Vers un espace judiciaire pénal européen
(Ed. de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2000); Vermeulen, “Where do we currently stand with
harmonisation in Europe?” in Klip and Van der Wilt op. cit. supra note 7; Peers, “Mutual
recognition and criminal law in the European Union: has the Council got it wrong?”, 41 CML
Rev. (2004), 5–36; Perron, “Perspectives of the harmonization of criminal law and criminal
procedure in the European Union” in Husabø and Strandbakken (Eds.), Harmonization of
criminal law in Europe, vol. 3 (Intersentia, 2005); Weyembergh, “Approximation of criminal
laws, the Constitutional Treaty and The Hague Programme”, 42 CML Rev. (2005) 1567–1597;
Weyembergh, “The functions of approximation of penal legislation within the European
Union”, 12MJ (2005), 149–172;Vogel, ‘The European Integrated Criminal Justice System and
its constitutional framework”, 12 MJ (2005), 125, 131; Lavenex, “Mutual recognition and the
monopoly of force: Limits of the single market analogy”, 14 Journal of European Public Policy
(2007), 762–779; Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 116.
11. Vermeulen, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 73
12. Manacorda, “La risposte pénale contre la criminalité organisée dans le droit de l’Union
Européenne” in Manacorda (Ed.), L’infraction d’organisation criminelle en Europe:
Allemagne – Espagne – France – Italie – Union Européenne (Presses Universitaires de France,
2002), pp. 271–275; Manacorda, “Introduction. L’intégration pénale indirecte: une première
définition” in Giudicelli-Delage and Manacorda (Eds.), L’intégration pénale indirecte:
Interactions entre droit pénal et coopération judiciaire au seins de l’Union européenne (Société
de législation comparée, 2005), p. 28; Kimmo Nuotio, “Harmonization of Criminal Sanctions
in the European Union – Criminal Law Science Fiction” in Husabø and Strandbakken, op. cit.
supra note 10; Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 10.
13. Lavenex, op. cit. supra note 10, 770; Monar, “Justice and Home Affairs”, 49 JCMS
(2011), 145–164.
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to show that “the EU is doing something about this”, rather than by a sound
decision-making process selecting the priorities to improve mutual
cooperation in criminal matters.14As a third factor, EUmeasures were drafted
without any previous study. The EU did not conduct any gap analysis to
identify loopholes and inconsistencies among national laws, no comparative
studies to recognize existing legal traditions and trends.15 Finally, the
evaluation of the impact of EU measures was very limited. Indeed, the
Commission’s reports on the implementation of the legal instruments
were restricted to the information provided by the Member States. Very
frequently, only a part of Member States provided any information to the
Commission.16
The above factors crucially influenced the quality and the added value of
the EU legal instruments approximating national criminal legislation. The FD
was no exception and its final text raised several issues.
2.2. The main criticisms of the Framework Decision among scholars
and EU institutions
Organized crime has always been one of the drivers of the process of
approximation of criminal law in the EU. Consensus about the need for
international action against organized crime has always been high.
Remarkably, organized crime, along with terrorism and drug-trafficking, was
included in the list of crimes enabling approximation of criminal legislation
since the Treaty of Amsterdam (Art. 29 TEU, Amsterdam version).
Indeed, the FD was the third and latest international legal instrument
directly addressing national criminal laws on organized crime. The first legal
measure in chronological order was the Joint Action on Making it a Criminal
Offence to Participate in a Criminal Organization in the Member States of the
European Union (hereinafter the Joint Action).17 It was the first
harmonization measure providing a legal definition of criminal organization
14. Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 10, 1585; Vermeulen, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 71.
15. Manacorda, “Le mandat d’arrêt européen et l’harmonisation substantielle: le
rapprochement des incriminations” in Giudicelli-Delage andManacorda, op. cit. supra note 12,
p. 72; Vermeulen, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 71; Van derWilt, “Some Critical Reflections on the
Process of Harmonisation” in Klip andVan derWilt, op. cit. supra note 7, p. 84;Vander Beken,
“Freedom, security and justice in the European Union’ in Klip and Van der Wilt, op. cit. supra
note 7, p. 97; Spinellis, “Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal law: Objections
to harmonisation and future perspectives” in Klip andVan derWilt op. cit. supra note 7, 90–93.
16. DeBiolley andWeyembergh, “L’évaluation dans le cadre du troisième pilier du traité sur
l’Union européenne” in Weyembergh and De Biolley (Eds.), Comment évaluer le droit pénal
européen? (Ed. de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2006), p. 84.
17. O.J 1998, L. 351/1–3.
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and was adopted in 1998.18 The second measure was the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted in 2000
(hereinafter the UNCTOC).19
These instruments, along with the FD, constitute an unmatched
international legal corpus attempting to harmonize and approximate national
legislation on organized crime.These efforts have been in place for some years
now. Indeed, the Joint Action dates back more than 13 years, and the UN
Convention has just celebrated the eleventh anniversary from its signature.
Given the existence of two previous instruments on the same topic, the FD
could legitimately be expected to be a sound legal instrument of high quality,
based on a careful analysis of the limitations of the previous measures.
Notwithstanding the above premises, the FD was the object of a number of
criticisms about its excessive broadness and actual enforceability of the
adopted provisions. In synthesis, criticisms about the FD focused on three
issues.
18. Mitsilegas, “Defining organised crime in the European Union: The limits of European
Criminal Law in an Area of ‘freedom, security and justice’” 26 EL Rev. (2001), 565–581;
Joutsen, International cooperation against transnational organized crime: the practical
experience of the European Union, vol. 59 (UNAFEI, 2002), Resource Material Series;
Joutsen, op. cit. supra note 9; Vincenzo Militello, “Participation in a Criminal Organisation as
a Model of European Criminal Offence” in Militello and Huber (Eds.), Towards a European
Criminal Law against Organised Crime: Proposals and Summaries of the Joint European
Project to Counter Organised Crime (Iuscrim, 2001); Fijnaut, “Controlling organised crime
and terrorism in the European Union” in Bassiouni and others (Eds.), European cooperation in
penal matters: Issues and perspectives (Cedam, 2008).
19. General Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 15 Nov. 2000. See also United Nations,
“Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the
United Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” A/55/383 Add. 1 of 3 Nov. 2000;
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Travaux Préparatoires of the negotiations for the elaboration
of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols
thereto” (United Nations, 2006); UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Legislative Guides for the
Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and
the Protocols thereto (United Nations, 2004); See also Gastrow, ‘The Origin of the Convention’
inAlbrecht and Fijnaut (Eds.),TheContainment of Transnational OrganizedCrime: Comments
on the UN Convention of December 2000 (Edition Iuscrim, 2002); Fijnaut, “The UN
Convention and the Global Problem of Organized Crime” in Albrecht and Fijnaut, ibid.;
Kilchling, “Substantive aspects of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime:
A step towards an ‘Organized Crime Code’?” inAlbrecht and Fijnaut, ibid.;VincenzoMilitello,
“Participation in an Organized Criminal Group as International Offence” in Albrecht and
Fijnaut, ibid.; Vlassis, “Drafting the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime” inWilliams andVlassis (Eds.), Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts,
Activities and Responses (Frank Cass, 2001); Vlassis, “The United Nations Convention on
Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols: A New Era in International Cooperation” in
The Changing Face of International Criminal Law (The International Centre for Criminal Law
Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, 2002); Orlova and Moore, “‘Umbrellas’ or ‘Building
Blocks’?: Defining International Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in
International Law”, 27 Houston Journal of International Law (2005), 267–310.
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The first issue is the very limited description of the typical features of
organized crime in Article 1.20 The criminal organization is defined in very
vague terms. Firstly, the structured association is defined with a negative
definition (Art. 1(2): “… not randomly formed for the immediate commission
of an offence, nor does it need to have formally defined roles for its members,
continuity of its membership, or a developed structure”). This provision
defines what a criminal organization is not, but does not provide any hint on
the elements which may positively describe a criminal organization.
Secondly, there is no mention of the modus operandi of the criminal
organization.The FD does not refer to elements such as intimidation, violence
and threat, which are the most typical features of organized crime.21 Thirdly,
other important characteristics are referred to in very elusive terms. For
example, the association must be “established over a period of time”. This
clause is extremely broad and may be interpreted in different ways. Requiring
a stable and continuous group, or even a permanent group, would have
resulted in an unsatisfactory solution, excluding more flexible criminal
organizations. Even worse, it would have overburdened the bodies involved in
law enforcement with excessive evidentiary requirements. However, the
current provision appears debatable. Indeed, it focuses on the actual duration
of the group (“ . . . established over a period of time . . . ”) instead of its
potential for duration. A better formulation should have focused on the
group’s potential to last and continue its criminal activities for a significant or
undetermined period.
The definition as described appears too vague to comply with the general
principles of criminal law, such as the principle of legality, clarity and
proportionality.22 It has a very limited selective capacity which is likely to
20. Article 1. Definitions. For the purposes of this Framework Decision:
1. “criminal organization” means a structured association, established over a period of time, of
more than two persons acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are
punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or
a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit;
2. “structured association” means an association that is not randomly formed for the immediate
commission of an offence, nor does it need to have formally defined roles for its members,
continuity of its membership, or a developed structure.
21. Finckenauer, “Problems of definition: What is organized crime?”, 8 Trends in
Organized Crime (2005), 63, 66; Bäckman, “The inflation of crime in Russia” in Organised
Crime & Crime Prevention – what works? Rapport fra NSfK:s 40. forskerseminar. Espoo,
Finland 1998 (Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology, 1998), 26; Spinellis,
“Grèce/Greece”, 68 Revue internationale de droit pénal (1997), 813;Vermeulen, op. cit. supra
note 10; Albanese, Organized Crime in Our Times, 5th ed. (Anderson Publishing, 2007).
22. Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note 18, 570; Joutsen, “International Instruments on
Cooperation in Responding to Transnational Crime” in Reichel (Ed.), Handbook of
Transnational Crime and Justice (Sage, 2005), p. 423; Verbruggen, “On containing organised
crime using ‘container offences’: Some reflections on substantive criminal law issues” in
Albrecht and Fijnaut (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 19, p. 130.
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result in the extension of the concept of organized crime to groups which do
not present significant danger to the society.23 As already argued in the
literature, “there is a danger, generally, in the promiscuous use of the label
organized crime with reference to perpetrators of ‘crimes that are organized,’
and also with criminal networks that lack what we regard as the essential
defining elements of being criminal organizations.”24 Indeed, the lower end of
the concept of criminal organization as defined by the FD is very close to the
mere complicity in a crime bymore than two offenders.25 To be in linewith the
general principles of criminal law, national legislators will likely have to
implement the FD with more detailed specifications.26 As a result, the
implementation process may eventually lead to inconsistencies in the national
provisions.
The second issue is the quantitative selection of the predicate offences of a
criminal organization.27 Article 1 includes among the possible predicate
offences all those punished with at least four years of maximum
imprisonment. This solution does not take into account that sanctioning
policies among different legal systems may vary significantly.28 The offences
selected by the mentioned threshold are likely to differ to some extent.29 The
solution adopted by the FD is questionable. Some States may raise
the penalties for some offences in order to have them falling within the
possible predicate offences; other States may reduce the penalties for the
opposite purpose. An alternative to the existing solution was the drafting of a
list of offences recognized as typical of organized crime. This was suggested
by a research project at the EU level and the option was discussed during the
23. Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note 18, 577; Symeonidou-Kastanidou, “Towards a new
definition of organised crime in the EuropeanUnion”, 15European Journal of Crime, Criminal
Law and Criminal Justice (2007), 83, 93.
24. Finckenauer, op. cit. supra note 21, 77–78.
25. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, op. cit. supra note 23, 97; Ambos, “Is the development of a
common substantive criminal law for Europe Possible? Some preliminary reflections”, 12 MJ
(2005), 173, 182–186; Paoli and Fijnaut, “Introduction to Part I: The History of the concept” in
Fijnaut and Paoli (Eds.),Organised crime in Europe: concepts, patterns and control policies in
the European Union and beyond (Springer, 2004) p. 41; Militello, op. cit. supra note 19, 103.
26. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, op. cit. supra note 23, 97–98; Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note
18, 576–577; Calderoni, “A definition that could not work: the EU Framework Decision on the
Fight against Organised Crime”, 16 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal
Justice (2008), 265, 275; Lahti and Sahavirta, “Finland”, 78Revue internationale de droit pénal
(2007), Rapports nationaux 1, 103.
27. Predicate offences are the offences which must be committed or planned by a criminal
organization.
28. Militello, op. cit. supra note 18, 25.
29. Vlassis (2002), op. cit. supra note 19, p. 92; Kilchling, op. cit. supra note 19, p. 91.
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negotiations for the UN Convention.30 Concern emerged that the changing
nature of organized crime and the development of new forms of criminality
could have made the list quickly obsolete or too rigid. Further, the inclusion of
some specific offences, like terrorist offences, in such a list, proved to be a
very sensitive point for some countries.31 The option for a list of offences was
consequently discarded in favour of the quantitative threshold. However, this
solution, coupled with the broad definition of criminal organization, resulted
in a further extension of the scope of the FD.32
The third issue is the double model offence. Article 2 of the FD requires
Member States to ensure that their criminal law covers two types of conduct,
alternatively or cumulatively.33 The two types of conduct correspond to the
two traditional criminal organization offences, namely the civil law criminal
association and the common law conspiracy.34 This approach was firstly
introduced in the Joint Action and has since been maintained also in the
UNCTOC and in the FD. The aim of the double model offence is to offer a
solution acceptable to countries from either the common law or the civil law
tradition.35 This would ensure higher political support to the implementation
30. For the research project, see Militello, op. cit. supra note 19; for the Palermo
Convention seeVlassis, op. cit. supra note 19, 81; For the different lists proposed, see “Travaux
Préparatoires of the negotiations . . . ” cited supra note 19.
31. Vlassis (2002), op. cit. supra note 19, p. 88.
32. In this regard, Militello (op. cit. supra note 19, 102) argued that a better solution would
have been to leave the specification of the concept of serious offences to the individual States at
the moment of ratification/implementation. In order to ensure some homogeneity, the
international legal instruments might have included a list of offences which have to be
considered as serious..
33. “Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that one or both of the
following types of conduct related to a criminal organization are regarded as offences:
(a) conduct by any person who, with intent and with knowledge of either the aim and general
activity of the criminal organization or its intention to commit the offences in question, actively
takes part in the organization’s criminal activities, including the provision of information or
material means, the recruitment of new members and all forms of financing of its activities,
knowing that such participation will contribute to the achievement of the organization’s
criminal activities;
(b) conduct by any person consisting in an agreement with one or more persons that an activity
should be pursued, which if carried out, would amount to the commission of offences referred
to in Article 1, even if that person does not take part in the actual execution of the activity”.
34. Criminal organization offences are criminal offences that require more than one person
in order to be committed and some sort of agreement, group, association or organization among
the offenders. Traditionally, the most important archetypes of COOs are the conspiracy model
and the criminal associationmodel. See, with further references,Manacorda, op. cit. supra note
9, 270–273; see also Maljevic´, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’:
Different Legal Models Against Criminal Collectives (Duncker & Humblot, 2011);
Schloenhardt, “Palermo on the Pacific Rim: Organised crime offences in the Asia Pacific
Region”, UNODC – Regional Centre for EastAsia and the Pacific,August 2009, Study Series.
35. Vlassis (2002), op. cit. supra note 19, p. 92; Schloenhardt, op.cit. supra note 34, 49.
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of the legal instruments thus providing stronger cooperation in the
enforcement of organized crime.36 However, it is clear from the analysis of the
preparatory works of the three instruments that the inclusion of two model
offences is the result of a political compromise. Particularly, in the EU, the
adoption of the FD was subject to the unanimous approval of all EU Member
States. During the negotiations, common law countries objected to the
Commission’s proposal of a single model for offences based on the concept of
criminal organization.37 During the negotiations of the FD, common law
countries exerted pressure to include in the final document a model offence
based on the offence of conspiracy.38 In this perspective, it seems legitimate to
argue that the current double model offence was the price for reaching
unanimity on the FD, rather than the outcome of a deliberate policy choice.39
Although strong political support is a fundamental element for the
successful drafting and implementation of international legal instrument, it is
reasonable to wonder whether a high price for such an objective has been paid.
The double model offence does not achieve the objective of a better
harmonization of organized crime offences among different legal systems.40
On the contrary, it waters down the main characteristics of organized crime to
the point where the participation in a criminal organization becomes a
meaningless container, equalizing very distant criminal law approaches.41 Not
surprisingly, the literature argued thatmost countries will not have to amend or
modify their national legislation to comply with the international legal
instruments.42 Further, the inclusion of the two model offences has prevented
the creation of a newmodel offence capable of overcoming the difficulties and
problems concerning both the conspiracy and the criminal associationmodels.
36. Vlassis (2001), op. cit. supra note 19, p. 360.
37. Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note 18, 570; Calderoni, op. cit. supra note 26, 278.
38. “IE and UK thought that the alternative option of criminalizing conspiracy from the
1998 Joint Action should be maintained. UK referred to the evidentiary difficulties UK
prosecutorial authorities would be faced with when trying to prove membership of a criminal
organization. In view of these legitimate law enforcement concerns and at the suggestion of BE,
the Presidency proposes to reinsert the alternative referring to conspiracy.” (Council Doc.
9864/05 of 8 June 2005, 6, fn. 3).
39. Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note 18, 571; Manacorda, ‘La risposte . . . ”, op. cit. supra
note 12, 287–288; Manacorda, op. cit. supra note 9, pp. 284–285.
40. Vermeulen, op. cit. supra note 10, pp. 71–74; Manacorda, ‘La risposte . . . ”, op. cit.
supra note 12, 270 and 287–288;Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 10, 1582; Calderoni, op. cit.
supra note 26, 280–282; Fijnaut, op. cit. supra note 18, p. 261.
41. Manacorda, op. cit. supra note 9, 281; Manacorda, ‘La risposte . . . ”, op. cit. supra
note 12, 287; Bäckman, op. cit. supra note 21, 32; Verbruggen, op. cit. supra note 22.
42. Joutsen, op. cit. supra note 9, 39; McClean, Transnational Organized Crime: A
Commentary on the UN Convention and its Protocols (OUP 2007), pp. 60–62; Calderoni, op.
cit. supra note 3.
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The debate about the FD was not merely confined to academic arguments,
but also involved European institutions and national governments. Firstly, the
approval of the final text of the of the FD in 2006 was accompanied by a
statement of the European Commission, joined by France and Italy, in which
they showed their disappointment with the finally approved text.43 This
declaration revealed that issues such as the double model offence approach
represented a critical point in the negotiations of the FD. One of the
institutions of the EU openly demonstrated dissatisfaction with it and this was
shared by two important EU Member States. Secondly, Eurojust in its 2010
Annual Report argued that “notable differences can be found (e.g. type of
predicate offences, continuity, penalties, etc.) and some Member States have
not provided for offences relating to participation in a criminal organization in
their criminal codes but have provided for offences of conspiracy to commit
particular crimes”.44
Lastly, the European Parliament has recently adopted the Resolution on
organized crime in the European Union.45 The Parliament acknowledged the
“extremely limited impact on the legislative systems of the Member States of
Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on organized crime, which has not made
any significant improvement to national laws or to operational cooperation to
counter organized crime”.46 It asked the Commission to table a new proposal
for the end of 2013, with “a more concrete definition of organized crime that
better identifies the key features of the phenomenon, focusing in particular on
the key concept of organization and also taking into account new types of
organized crime”.47 Furthermore, the Parliament explicitly required the
Commission to make “a study of the abolition of the current dual approach
43. “The Commission considers that the Framework Decision . . . fails to achieve the
objective sought by the Commission in relation to JointAction 98/733/JHA . . . and in relation
to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime . . . to which the
Community has been a party since 29Apr. 2004.The Framework Decision does not achieve the
minimum degree of approximation of acts of directing or participating in a criminal
organization on the basis of a single concept of such an organization, as proposed by the
Commission . . . Furthermore, the Framework Decision enables Member States not to
introduce the concept of criminal organization but to continue to apply existing national
criminal law by having recourse to general rules on participation in and preparation of specific
offences.
The Commission is therefore obliged to note that the Framework Decision does not achieve the
objective of the approximation of legislation on the fight against transnational organized crime
as provided for in the Hague Programme.” (Council Doc. 9067/06 of 10 May 2006). See also
Calderoni, op. cit. supra note 26, 279.
44. Eurojust, “Annual Report 2010”, 47 <www.eurojust.europa.eu/press_annual_
report_2010.htm>.
45. European Parliament, Resolution of 25 Oct. 2011 on organised crime in the European
Union P7_TA(2011)0459.
46. Ibid., para 7.
47. Ibid.
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(which criminalizes both membership and conspiracy) and the identification
of a range of typical offences which, regardless of the maximum sentence
permitted in the legal system ofMember States, could be deemed to constitute
such a criminal offence”.48 Notably, the Parliament’s resolution appears in
line with the above mentioned arguments made by the literature concerning
the quality of the FD.
In conclusion, the EU policies of approximation of criminal laws and the
FD met strong criticisms about their lack of legitimacy, quality and
effectiveness, both among scholars and policymakers. These arguments point
out that the European legislaturemay havemissed an important opportunity to
learn from past errors and overcome the most critical points of previous
international legal measures on organized crime. Contrarily, it seems that the
Council privileged consistency with previous international legal instruments
over more penetrating and effective solutions when drafting the FD.
Given this problematic background, the Commission and the Council are
likely to face a critical decision in the forthcoming assessments, not only for
the destiny of the FD, but also for the EU approach in the field of
approximation of criminal law, and even for the EU policy in the AFSJ in
general. Once again, there is the risk that EU institutions may disregard the
opinion of the scholars and of practitioners and, instead of tackling the
problematic issues, aim at a compromise solution, resulting in a static, trompe
l’oeil, approximation. The choice of the Commission and the Council will
determine whether the AFSJ will turn back from a merely reactive approach,
mainly driven by the need to respond to external events such as scandals,
terrorist attacks and sensational cases, to adopt a more strategic,
evidence-based policy grounded on adequate preliminary analysis of specific
problems.
In the light of these considerations, detailed analysis of the actual impact of
the FD in Member States’ legislation is an important prerequisite for the
assessment by the EU institutions. While the Commission’s reports have
frequently been influenced by the provision of information by the Member
States, the next section attempts to evaluate the implementation of the FD and
to verify the above discussed criticisms on the basis of a comparative analysis
of national organized crime legislation of EU Member States.
48. Ibid.
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3. The impact of the Framework Decision on the fight against
organized crime
3.1. Tradition and innovation: Problems and frictions among EU
Member States’ organized crime legislation
The analysis of EU Member States legal traditions and specific laws against
criminal organizations, with the aim of identifying problems and frictions, is
a preliminary step for the assessment of the impact of the FD.
There are three main approaches to the criminalization of organized crime
among the Member States of the EU. Each approach developed a different
solution to criminal organization offences (hereinafter COOs) and it is
inherently related to the different legal traditions of European countries. They
are the civil law, the common law and the Scandinavian approach. The civil
law approach is based on the concept of criminal association or criminal
organization. In general, it punishes the participants in an association which
has the purpose of committing crimes. The most direct origin of the approach
can be traced back to the 1810 French Criminal Code, with the offence of
association de malfaiteurs (Arts. 265 et seq.). The idea of association or
organization has always been at the centre of this approach. Even today, all EU
Member States from the civil law tradition have in their criminal legislation an
offence amenable to this model.
The common law approach is based on the offence of conspiracy as
developed by English courts throughout more than six centuries of
jurisprudence. Conspiracy can be defined as the agreement to commit a crime,
and the concept and proof of the agreement is its main element. This approach
can be found in the UK jurisdictions49 as well as in the countries whose legal
systems are strongly influenced by English law, namely Cyprus, Ireland and
Malta.
The Scandinavian approach has been traditionally based on the rejection of
COOs for organized crime cases. This is because Scandinavian criminal law
relies heavily on the aggravating circumstances and the general rules on
complicity to punish groups or organizations.50 Indeed, even today Denmark
and Sweden do not have any COO, notwithstanding their ratification of the
49. For criminal matters, the UK comprises three jurisdictions: England &Wales, Scotland,
and Northern Ireland. Although they generally share very similar legislation, this article refers
to England &Wales unless differently stated.
50. Cornils and Greve, “Denmark on the road to organised crime” in Fijnaut and Paoli
(Eds.), Organised crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European
Union and Beyond (Springer 2004); Asp, “Sweden”, 78 Revue internationale de droit pénal:
Rapports nationaux (2007), 2–280; Flyghed, “Sweden” in Den Boer (Ed.),Organised crime:A
catalyst in the Europeanisation of National Police and Prosecution Agencies? (European
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UN Convention and the entry into force of the FD. Only Finland has
introduced such an offence and, in line with the Scandinavian traditions, the
text of the offence reveals a particular consideration for citizens’ rights and
freedoms. Indeed, the offence requires that at least one predicate offence “or
its punishable attempt is committed”, a unique solution among all EUMember
States (Chapt. 17, section 1(a) of the Criminal Code). The offence also shows
some influence of the EU Joint Action of 1998, since paragraph 4, the
definition of criminal organization, is drawn from the international measure.
The three approaches focus on different aspects of criminal organizations
and this has frequently created frictions in international cooperation against
organized crime. For example, the civil law approach mainly revolves around
the proof of a relatively stable association or organization among different
individuals.This does not always require the existence of a specific agreement
among all members, an element which is the core of the offence of conspiracy
adopted by common law countries. Conversely, a simple agreement to commit
a crime frequently does not satisfy civil law countries, where in some cases the
criminal law explicitly excludes mere agreements from the scope of criminal
law.51 Furthermore, both the civil and common law approachesmay encounter
difficulties in international cooperation with Scandinavian countries, since
these legal systems will require proof of the commission of specific predicate
offences, whichmay not always be possible (e.g. the criminal organization has
not yet committed any offence or evidence is still weak) or required (e.g. the
offence of conspiracy does not require proof that the agreement was
successful). Not surprisingly, the frictions between these approaches and legal
traditions were among the main drivers for the development of the
above-mentioned international legal instruments in the field of organized
crime.52
Even within the same approach, EU Member States have adopted very
different, and frequently contrasting, definitions and approaches to organized
crime. For example, some civil law countries have innovated their criminal
laws, introducing special COOs, specifically drafted to address organized
crime groups. The archetype of this trend is the Italian mafia-type criminal
Institute of Public Administration 2002); Kruize, “Denmark”, in Den Boer, ibid.; Hietalahti,
“Finlande/Finland”, 68 Revue internationale de droit pénal (1997), 773–791; Bäckman, op. cit.
supra note 21.
51. A clear example is Art. 115 (1) of the Italian Criminal Code which states that “except
differently stated by the law, whenever two or more persons agree to commit a crime and this is
not committed, none is punishable for the mere agreement” (author’s translation).
52. Martin, “Dual criminality in organized crime cases”, 62 Revue internationale de droit
pénal (1991), 175–181; Bay, “Definitions of organized crime in the European Union: A
criminological perspective” in Organised Crime & Crime Prevention – what works? Rapport
fra NSfK:s 40. forskerseminar. Espoo, Finland 1998 (Scandinavian Research Council for
Criminology 1998) 27–28; Manacorda, “La risposte …”, op. cit. supra note 12.
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association (Art. 416-bis of the Italian Criminal Code), adopted in 1982.
Several countries followed this path, including Belgium (Arts. 324-bis et seq.
of the Criminal Code), Luxembourg (Arts. 324-bis et seq. of the Criminal
Code),Austria (§ 278a of the Criminal Code), Romania (Arts. 7 et seq. of law
39 of 2003) and Greece (Art. 187 of the Criminal Code). In these cases,
national legislators have introduced different concepts and definitions,
specifying the objectives, the activities, the modi operandi of criminal
associations. Although the intention to provide precise definitions of the
criminalized conduct is praiseworthy, this has also increased the
inconsistencies among different COOs, inevitably affecting international
cooperation among Member States. For example, the mentioned Article
416-bis of the Italian Criminal Code punishes mafia groups not only when
their goal is the commission of offences, but also when they more generally
aim “to acquire, directly or not, the management of or even just the control
over economic activities, the concession of authorizations, public
procurement contracts or public services, or to obtain illegal profits or
advantages for themselves and for others” (author’s translation). This
provision allows prosecution of mafia organizations aiming at infiltrating the
legitimate economy through illicit influence, even if the proof of any offence
is lacking or difficult to achieve (e.g. obtaining the award of public works
contracts by local politicians in exchange for votes or other forms of support).
At the same time, it differs from the offences provided by other Member
States, since it extends its scope beyond organizations aiming to commit
offences. Other legal systems may therefore request evidence of the
commission of one or more specific offences as a condition for cooperation.
The analysis reveals a variety of legal solutions and approaches among EU
Member States.While diversity per se should not be necessarily considered a
problem, the present state of affairs suggests that frictions and inconsistencies
among national laws may actually occur. A further example relating to the
penalty provided for the mere participation in a criminal organization may
clarify this. Penalties vary significantly among EU Member States (See Map
1). The standard penalty for the mere participation in a group ranges from a
maximum of two years of imprisonment in Finland (and three years in
Belgium, Luxembourg and Cyprus) to a maximum of fifteen years in
Lithuania and twenty years in Romania.53 Furthermore, for conspiracy the
penalty is normally proportionate to the penalty for the most serious one
agreed offence. This does not even consider the general rules on the
imposition of penalties and the presence of aggravating circumstances (both
53. According to Art. 7(2) of Romanian law 39 of 2003 the penalty for the COO cannot
exceed the penalty for the most serious crime which falls within the aim of the criminal
organization.
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as general provisions and specific for participation in a criminal organization)
and the possibility of different penalties for leaders, organizers, directors,
financers.
Such disparity in penalties among EUMember States may hinder effective
international cooperation against criminal organizations. For example, in
Finland the penalty for participation in a criminal organization is below the
threshold of three years of maximum imprisonment for a European Arrest
Warrant, or for a European Evidence Warrant for carrying out a search or
seizure, without verification the double criminality of the act.54 Consequently
an EAW or an EEW for search/seizure issued by Finland would be subject to
verification of double criminality.
Map 1 – Maximum penalty for participation in a criminal organization
Source: author’s elaboration
54. See Art. 2(2) of Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA) and Art. 14(2)
of Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 Dec. 2008 on the European evidence
warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in
criminal matters.
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In this general context of differing traditions and diverging innovations, two
broad trends emerge.
The first is the slow and laborious convergence toward the civil law model
offence of Member States belonging to the common law (Ireland, Malta,
Cyprus) and Scandinavian traditions (Finland).55 These countries have
introduced new COOs in their criminal legislation. The international legal
instruments on organized crime, and particularly the civil law model of
criminal association, have partially inspired the drafting process of these new
offences. Remarkably, common law countries have introduced criminal
association offences without being obliged to do so, since the traditional
conspiracy would have satisfied their international obligations. However, this
process is far from straightforward. For example, concerning the introduction
of the offence of participation in a criminal organization in Ireland, it was
argued that “the Irish definition was coined without any specific examination
of the area and with no regard to Irish circumstances. Conforming to
international obligations overrode the need to enact legislation that was
tailored to Ireland’s criminal justice problems”.56 In 2009, Ireland amended
the Criminal Justice Act 2006 and the offences relating to criminal
organizations (Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009). Once again, one of
the motives was to comply with international obligations.57 In addition, the
difficulties in the implementation of the new legislation (Davey argued that no
prosecutions were brought in the first two years,58 although unsuccessful
prosecutions would be a better indicator of failure) induced the legislature to
“simplify the existing offence of participation in a criminal organization”,
with the purpose of enhancing “the ability to bring prosecutions for offences
of directing or participating in organized crime”.59 The Irish example
suggests that the transplantation of legal concepts and offences is not an easy
step. Indeed, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark still show
considerable reluctance to the introduction of new COOs. The criticisms
regarding the quality of the civil lawmodel offencemay have played a role this
reticence.60
55. For Ireland, see Section 72 of the Criminal JusticeAct 2006; For Malta, seeArt. 83A of
the Criminal Code; for CyprusArt. 63A and 63B of the Criminal Code; for Finland, see Chapter
17(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
56. Davey, “Organised crime in Ireland: A policy analysis of the introduction of organised
crime to the Irish Statute Book” (Master’s dissertation, Dublin Institute of Technology 2008),
41 .<arrow.dit.ie/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=aaschssldis>.
57. Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009: Explanatory and Financial Memorandum
(Irish Statute Book 2009), 1 <www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0032.pdf>.
58. Davey, op. cit. supra note 56, 32.
59. Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, cited supra note 57, 2.
60. Joutsen, International Cooperation against Transnational Organized Crime:
Criminalising Participation in an Organized Criminal Group, vol. 59 (UNAFEI 2002),
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The second trend concerns Member States which have more recently
acceded to the EU. In some of these countries, COOs are often drafted very
similarly (if not identically) to the model offences of the international legal
instruments. In particular, the above criticized notions of criminal
organization and structured association have found their way into the criminal
law of some EU Member States.61 This may be the result of criminal justice
reforms adopted under (national or European) pressure to gain accession to
the Union. Legislators may have renounced a critical analysis of
international/European models in favour of a swift adoption of norms
formally compliant with the EU requirements.62
While the above trends uncover some slow changes (not always for the
better), most EU Member States (and particularly the major ones) have not
amended their COOs significantly or the changes did not pay great attention to
the FD requirements. This is especially the case for the older and more
powerful Member States. For example, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands and Portugal maintained their offences, although the
inconsistencies among these legislations are still relevant.63 For example, in
Germany, the jurisprudence has consistently applied a restrictive
interpretation ofArticle 129 of the Criminal Code on criminal organization. In
particular, it required that the members of the association pursue a common
goal and feel part of a common union, where the individual will is submitted
to the common will of the group.64 This interpretation makes the offence
Resource Material Series 423; Harding, “The offence of belonging: Capturing participation in
organised crime” (2005) Criminal Law Review, 690–700.
61. See Bulgarian Criminal Code, Art. 93(20); Romanian law 39 of 2003, Art. 2(a);
Slovakian Criminal Code, art. 129(2).. Interestingly, criticisms about the introduction of new
organized crime legislation based on need to comply with European measures were
encountered also in other countries. See the Irish example supra at notes 57 et seq. and Greece
(Symeonidou-Kastanidou, op. cit. supra note 23).
62. De Hert and Pitto, “Mutual Trust and Enlargement” in Weyembergh and De Biolley
(Eds), La Confiance Mutuelle dans l’Éspace pénal Européen/Mutual Trust in the European
Criminal Area (Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles 2006); for example, for Hungary, see
Fehér and Geller Balàzs, “Hongrie/Hungary” 69 Revue internationale de droit pénal (1998),
389–404; Karsai and Végvári, “Hungary”, 78 Revue internationale de droit pénal: Rapports
nationaux (2007), 1–188; for Slovenia, see Jakulin, “Slovénie/Slovenia”, 69 Revue
internationale de droit pénal (1998), 501–511.
63. In 2010, Spain introduced an interesting reform, criminalizing the participation in
criminal organizations and criminal groups along with the traditional offence of illicit
association. The FD and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime have
partially influenced the new Spanish discipline, although the stronger influences come from the
national jurisprudence and doctrine. For more details, see Fiscal General del Estado, “Circular
2/2011, sobre la reforma del Código Penal por Ley Orgánica 5/2010 en relación con las
organizaciones y grupos criminales” (Fiscalía General del Estado, 2 June 2011).
64. Volk, “La risposte pénale contre les organisations criminelles en droit allemand” in
Manacorda (2002) op. cit. supra note 12, p. 24; Fornasari, “Le strategie di contrasto alla
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hardly applicable to most criminal organizations, where a few individuals
coordinate or take decisions for all the participants.65 This interpretation by
the German jurisprudence is unique among all EUMember States.As a result,
the German COO requires an element which is rarely found among criminal
organizations and is also irrelevant for all other EU legislations. Clearly, this
may create frictions in international cooperation. This approach has not been
modified up to the present day, and significantly restricts the application of
Article 129 which, in practice, is more frequently used as a instrument to
enable more powerful investigative measures.66 Furthermore, the UK remains
the only common law country relying solely on the traditional offence of
conspiracy to enforce criminal organizations. In general, the offence of
conspiracy has been frequently criticized by common law scholars and its
usefulness in organized crime cases is debated.67 Nevertheless, the UK has so
far maintained conspiracy as the only COO for tackling criminal
organizations. On the one side, this has been reflected in the negotiations of
the FD, resulting in the above criticized compromise solution of the double
model offence (see above section 2.2). On the other side, as already discussed
in this section, the common law approach focuses on the agreement to commit
a crime, independently from its actual commission and this is at odds with
most EU Member States legislation.
In conclusion, this section has showed that a common understanding of the
concept of criminal organization is far from being realized and legal
approaches vary significantly among national legal systems. This situation
creates problems and frictions between differing national legislation, and may
have noticeable impact on international cooperation. Indeed, it is in contrast
with the creation of a commonEuropean approach to organized crime,making
it difficult for law enforcement agencies and supranational bodies such as
Europol and Eurojust to cooperate, since they have to coordinate a number of
different legislative provisions and conceptions of criminal organizations.
criminalità organizzata: aspetti comparatistici nell’esperienza europeo-continentale” in
Fornasari (Ed.), Strategie di contrasto alla criminalità organizzata nella prospettiva di diritto
comparato (Cedam 2002), p. 177; Council of Europe, Effectiveness of provisions on
membership in criminal organisations (Council of Europe 2004), 22; Kinzig, “Les règles de
fond sur la lutte contre le crime organisé. Fight against organised crime in criminal law”, paper
presented at the XVII International Congress of Comparative Law (2006), 6–7; Weisser,
“Germany” 78 Revue internationale de droit pénal: Rapports nationaux (2007), 1, 163;Wenin,
“La criminalità organizzata nell’esperienza giuridica tedesca” in Fornasari (Ed.), Modelli
sanzionatori per il contrasto alla criminalità organizzata. Un’analisi di diritto comparato
(Università degli Studi di Trento 2007), pp.259–260.
65. Volk, op. cit. supra note 64, p. 25.
66. Kinzig, op. cit. supra note 64, 7–8.
67. UKHome Office,One StepAhead:A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime
(Home Office 2004); Harding, op. cit. supra note 60.
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These difficulties may prevent the strengthening of mutual trust among EU
Member States, which is a fundamental prerequisite for the smooth
functioning of international cooperation. Police, prosecutors and judges may
have difficulties in applying provisions which are not only different from their
domestic legislation, but may even be in contrast with it. Inevitably, this would
make procedures and operations more burdensome and costly.68
3.2. Assessment of the impact of the Framework Decision
A previous study on the impact of the FD at the moment of its entry into force
raised doubts about its actual added value.69 In particular, it highlighted that
most EU Member States were already in compliance with EU standards.
Indeed, 16Member States were considered fully compliant with the FD, and 9
were not compliant only in one out of nine indicators.70 The remaining two
Member States were Sweden and Denmark which, as alreadymentioned, have
a traditional distrust towards COOs. Consequently, notwithstanding the
requirements by international measures, they had not yet introduced any such
offence.
The requirements of the FD which turned out to be most problematic in the
previous analysis concerned the aggravating circumstance of Article 3(2),71
and the liability of legal persons ofArticle 5.72 The low level of compliance of
68. For further detailed examination of these problems, see Weyembergh, op. cit. supra
note 10.
69. The assessment of the level of approximation wasmade through a set of 17 indicators of
approximation, each based on one specific requirement of the FD:
Number of members (Art.1); Number of predicate offences (Art.1); Type of predicate offences
(Art.1); Structure of the group (Art.1); Continuity of the group (Art.1);Additional requirements
(Art.1); Offences relating to participation in a criminal organization (Art.2); Standard penalty
for participation/membership (Art.3); Aggravating circumstance (Art.3); Special
circumstances (Art.4); Crimes committed by persons having a leading position within the legal
person (Art.5); Crimes made possible by lack of supervision or control (Art.5);
Criminal/non-criminal fines (Art.6); Other sanctions (Art.6); Territorial jurisdiction (Art.7);
Jurisdiction over offences committed by a national (Art.7); Jurisdiction over offences
committed for the benefit of a legal person established in the territory (Art.7). For further
details, see Calderoni, op. cit. supra note 3.
70. Calderoni, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 161.
71. Art. 3(2) of the FD: “Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure
that the fact that offences referred to inArticle 2, as determined by thisMember State, have been
committed within the framework of a criminal organization, may be regarded as an aggravating
circumstance”.
72. The FD requires Member States to introduce the liability of legal persons for the
participation in a criminal organization committed, for the benefit of the legal person, either a)
by a person having a leading position within the legal person or b) by a person under the
authority of, and due to a lack of supervision or control by a person having a leading position
within the legal person.
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EU Member States with these requirements does not appear a sufficient
justification for the adoption of the FD.They are accessory issues compared to
the problems of the offences of participation in a criminal organization.As for
the liability of legal persons, other international measures had already
required its introduction (e.g. theOECDConvention onCombating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials or the UNCTOC) and therefore the FD was not
necessary. Further, the provision on the aggravating circumstances revealed
some problems of interpretation, probably due to amere error of transcription,
which makes it a very problematic provision.73 Except for these minor issues,
EU Member States showed very high levels of compliance with the
requirements of the FD even before its entry into force.
Update of the comparative analysis to the end of 2011 substantiates the
already mentioned paradox of the approximation of organized crime
legislation. The FD contains such broad provisions that the level of
compliance with the EU requirements is high, notwithstanding the
inconsistencies highlighted above in section 3.1. 74 The changes in EU
Member States legislation after the entry into force of the FD and the expiry of
the deadline for its implementation have modified the situation (see Map 2).
New provisions or amendments to organized crime legislation have been
introduced in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Italy and Spain.
Further, a new Criminal Code has been approved in Romania since 2009, but
its entry into force is still pending. Overall, the majority of EUMember States
complies with most of the provisions set by the FD and this comes as no
surprise, given broadness of the EU requirements. At the same time, no
Member State changed its national legislation in the parts which were not
complying with the FD requirements. This is not just a matter of minor
73. The final text version is probably the result of a mere error of transcription which has
altered the original meaning of the text. During the negotiations the provision always referred to
Art. 1 (definition of criminal organization and of the predicate offences). See Commission,
Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the fight against organised crime,
COM(2005)6, 5–6; Council Doc. 9067/06 of 10May 2006, cited supra note 43.The final text of
the FD unexpectedly changed and referred to Art. 2 (offences relating to the participation in a
criminal organization).There is no trace of the reasons underlying this change in the documents
of the Council. The outcome is rather tautological, since the current text suggests that the
participation in a criminal organization may be aggravated when committed within the
framework of a criminal organization. During ameeting, the author discussed this problemwith
the Commission unit responsible for the FD and the officials agreed on the issue. Without
doubt, this is a problematic provision which should be corrected. See also Calderoni, op. cit.
supra note 3, p. 39.
74. The update excluded the indicators concerning the optional requirements of the FD and
also those on the liability of legal persons (which should be covered by other international
instruments) and the indicator on the aggravating circumstance of Art. 3(2) (as argued in the
previous footnote the provision is flawed and should be amended). Overall, the updated
assessment of the impact of the FD was based on 9 indicators.
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amendments, as demonstrated, for example, by the lack of any COO in
Denmark and Sweden.As argued above, this type of offence is contrary to the
Scandinavian approach to COOs. This signals that legal traditions have
prevailed over international and European legal measures. Overall, the
analysis substantiates the trompe l’oeil nature of the FD: its provisions are so
broad that all the significantly diverging national legislation of the EU
Member States are formally in compliance with them.
Map 2 – EU Member States’ compliance with the Framework Decision on
the Fight against Organized Crime. Number of non-complying indicators (out
of 9 indicators)
Source: author’s elaboration
In particular, except for Denmark and Sweden, the problems of compliance
with the FD concern only one specific indicator for nine Member States.
Lithuania (Art. 25(4) of the Criminal Code), France (Art. 450-1(1) of the
Criminal Code), Hungary (Art. 137(8) of the Criminal Code) and Slovakia
(Arts. 11 and 129(4) of the Criminal Code) do not comply with the FD
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requirements relating to the type of predicate offences that can be committed
by a criminal organization. As already mentioned, the FD prescribes that a
criminal organization should have the aim to commit offences punishable with
at least four years ofmaximum imprisonment (Art. 1 of the FD). Nevertheless,
the mentioned Member States set a higher threshold. France, Hungary and
Slovakia require that a criminal organization aims at crimes punishable with at
least five years, while Lithuania requires that a criminal organization commits
one or more serious or grave crimes (penalty exceeding six and ten years of
maximum imprisonment respectively).
Furthermore, Estonia (Art. 255(1) of the Criminal Code) and Bulgaria (Art.
93(20) of the Criminal Code) explicitly require that the criminal organization
is potentially permanent. This approach may contrast with the requirement of
the FD that a criminal organization need not have “continuity of its
membership”. However, the national provisions may be interpreted with more
flexibility and this may bring them in line the EU requirements without the
need of any amendment.
Belgium does not seem to comply with the FD since it requires additional
elements restricting the scope of the national laws. Articles 322 et seq. of the
Criminal Code on criminal association require that the association aims at
threatening persons or properties (“dans le but d’attenter aux personnes ou
aux propriétés”). Unless interpreted in a very broad sense, this may exclude a
number of offences perpetrated by criminal organizations (e.g. criminal
groups aiming at forgery of documents, corruption of public officials,
infiltrating public procurement procedures). Article 324 on criminal
organization require the use of intimidation, threat, violence, “manoeuvres
frauduleuses” or corruption or the exploitation of enterprises (“structures
commerciales ou autres”) to dissimulate or facilitate the commission of
crimes. This provision exceeds the EU requirements and restricts the scope of
the offence, potentially leaving out of the domain of the norm groupswhich do
not use such modi operandi. Remarkably, this solution has been deliberately
adopted by Belgium in order to limit the application of the broad definition
adopted by the international legal instruments on organized crime.75
75. Belgium has always paid great attention to the reference to the modi operandi of the
criminal organizations also in international fora. Indeed, during the negotiations of both the
JointAction and the UNCTOC, the Belgian delegation proposed to mention themodi operandi
of criminal organization, i.e. the use of intimidation, threat, violence, fraud or corruption; See
Traest, “Les règles de fond sur la lutte contre le crime organisé/Fight against organised crime in
criminal law” in Dirix and Leleu (Eds.), The Belgian Reports at the Congress of Utrecht of the
International Academy of Comparative Law (Bruylant 2006), p. 762; McClean, op. cit. supra
note 42, p. 39. These proposals were not retained in the final texts. Further, Belgium made a
statement onArt. 1 of the JointAction: “The Belgian delegation considers that the definition of
‘criminal organization’given inArticle 1 includes themodi operandi used by the perpetrators of
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Consequently, it does not seem likely that Belgium will change this provision
(already slightly modified to comply with the UNCTOC)76 to implement the
FD.Although the aim of restricting the application of such broad international
models is laudable, it appears that Belgian criminal law may not cover any
form of active participation in a criminal organization’s criminal activities, as
requested by the FD.
Latvia (Art. 224 of the Criminal Code) explicitly requires that the criminal
organization is armed.Therefore, a group which is not armed, or whose armed
nature was impossible to prove, may fall outside of the scope of this offence.
This contrasts with the requirements of the FD which does not mention the
armed nature of the criminal organization.
The already mentioned interpretation of Section 129 of the German
Criminal Code, requiring that all members of a criminal organization are
subject to the “common will” of the group may hinder the full compliance of
Germany with the requirements of the FD, since this requirement restricts the
scope of application of the participation in a criminal organization to a limited
number of cases.
Remarkably, the wide variety in penalties among Member States (see
above, section3.1) does not pose any problem of compliance with the FD. All
EU Member States comply with the requirement of a maximum penalty of at
least between two and five years of deprivation of liberty. The differences
emerging for the example of the previous section are all in line the EU
requirements.
The impact of the FD, after the expiry of the deadline for its
implementation, appears to be low. This measure was drafted in such broad
terms that most EU Member States were already in full compliance with it
before its entry into force. This may have been the result of the complex
institutional setting of the Third Pillar, requiring unanimity of all the Member
States, but also of the lack of previous comparative analysis of the national
legislation. Furthermore, among the few Member States with some possible
inconsistencies with the requirements of the FD, no Member State has
changed its national legislation to achieve higher compliance. While some
new codes, new provisions and new amendments have been approved in the
last years, the influence of the EUmodels has largely remained in the political
the offence. The modi operandi cover the use of intimidation, threats, violence, fraudulent
manipulation or corruption or the use of commercial or other structures to dissimulate or
facilitate the perpetration of offences”; O.J. 1998, L 351/3.
76. At first, the reference to themodi operandiwas inArt. 324bis (the definition of criminal
organization). In 2005 the law ratifying the UNCTOC moved the reference fromArt. 324bis to
Art. 324ter of the Criminal Code.The reference now applies only to the offence of participation
in a criminal organization (Art. 324ter[1]). See Verbruggen and Traest, “Belgique” 78 Revue
internationale de droit pénal: Rapports nationaux (2007) 1, 28.
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declarations. The traditional approaches to COOs (civil law, common law and
Scandinavian approach) showed significant resistance against legal
transplants, particularly from a supranational source. It is highly possible that
the very poor quality of the FD (broad definitions, quantitative selection of
predicate offences, double model offence) further decreased its appeal for
national legislators.
All the above discussed problems of compliance may result in the
expansion of the scope of organized crime legislation. Independently of their
effectiveness and opportuneness (which should be assessed by policy makers,
prosecutors, lawyers, police and legal scholars), all the mentioned national
provisions have a scope which is narrower than the model offences provided
by the FD. Enforcing compliance with the EU requirements in this field may
result in obliging Member States to extend the scope of their criminal laws.
This is particularly problematic given the poor quality of the EU measure and
the generic provisions defining the criminal organization and criminalizing
the participation in it.
In conclusion, the impact of the FD on the national legislation appears
questionable. The FD is a measure of poor legal quality which does not
address the inconsistencies and frictions among Member States’ national
legislation. On the one side, this is the cause of the extremely limited impact of
the FD on the national laws. On the other side, however scarce may be the
influence of the FD, it may end up in an unwarranted extension of the scope of
criminal law and in particular of the existing offences of participation in a
criminal organization.
4. Conclusions: future developments
This article identified the main problems of EU policies of approximation of
organized crime legislation, with a particular focus on the FD. Subsequently,
it demonstrated that existing legislation among the Member States may cause
frictions and ultimately hinder the strengthening of mutual trust and the
smooth functioning of international cooperation. The analysis of the
implementation of the FD demonstrated that the definition of criminal
organization “does not work” and has had a very limited impact in reducing
the inconsistencies and improving harmony among national laws. On the
contrary, the FD may force Member States to over-extend the scope of their
national provisions on organized crime.
In this general context, the future developments are particularly uncertain.
The Treaty of Lisbon has significantly changed the institutional and legal
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framework of the AFSJ.77 However, these improvements should not be
expected to have immediate effects in the field of the approximation of
organized crime legislation. Indeed, all acts adopted under theThird Pillar will
remain in force until their repeal, annulment or amendment. Furthermore, for
a period of five years the power of the Commission to bring Member States
before the Court for infringement of their duties to implement EUmeasures is
frozen and the jurisdiction of the Court will remain as under the previous legal
framework, unless the acts in force are amended.This powermay be useful not
only to bring Member States to modify their national legislation to ensure
compliance with the FD (for the few provisions which do not comply with the
very broad requirements of the FD), but even more importantly it may allow
the Commission to play a more active role and stimulate a substantial
approximation of the national legislation.
Several considerations suggest that improvements in this field are not
around the corner. First, it is hard to expect a new proposal for an EUDirective
on organized crime, or even an amendment of the FD, in the next months. The
current Commission Work Programme for 2012 does not include any
legislative initiative in the field of organized crime legislation.78According to
Article 76 TFEU the initiative may come from one quarter of Member States,
but this appears difficult to imagine, given the inconsistency among national
legislation in this field.
Second, the Council will hardly support a new Directive or amendment to
the FD. This would imply the application of the Treaty of Lisbon, which has
reduced the influence of the Council on theAFSJ. Indeed, the only Directives
adopted until now in the field of substantive criminal law are the new 2011
Directive on trafficking in human beings and the 2011 Directive on sexual
exploitation of children and child pornography.79 However, these initiatives
had started in 2008 as new Framework Decisions and were “lisbonised”
during their drafting process, due to the entry into force of the Treaty of
77. Peers, “Finally ‘fit for Purpose’? The Treaty of Lisbon and the end of the Third Pillar
legal order” 27 YEL (2009); Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note 6; Monar (Ed.), The Institutional
Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (P.I.E Peter Lang
2010).
78. Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2012: Delivering European Renewal
COM(2011)777 final vol 1/2.
79. Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5Apr. 2011 on
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing
Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, O.J. 2011, L 101/1 and Directive 2011/92/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual
abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council
Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, O.J. 2011, L 335/1.
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Lisbon.80 Two new Directives in nearly two years and a half is not a steady
pace, and this is probably due to the EU institutions’ need to adapt to the new
institutional and legal framework.
For the reasons above, it seems also unlikely that a new Directive will be
adopted or that the FDwill be amended before the expiry of the 5-years period,
on 1 December 2014. After that date, the Commission will be able to play a
more active role, but much will depend on its political priorities.
Overall, it seems that even a poor instrument such as the FD may remain in
force for a long time and this may protract its negative effects.
Given these premises, it is probable that the FD will be the measure of
reference for the next years. As already mentioned in the introduction, in the
forthcoming months the Commission will draft a report on the
implementation of the FD, based on the information provided by the Member
States. Subsequently, the Council will be called to assess the FD.This round of
evaluation should be conducted with particular attention to avoid repeating
previous mistakes (humanum fuit errare, diabolicum est per animositatem in
errore manere). Better evaluation is indeed one of the priorities of the
Stockholm Programme, adopted at the end of 2009.81 It calls for independent
and peer-reviewed assessments whose results should be shared with the
Parliament. In particular, the Stockholm Programme explicitly provides that
“judicial cooperation in criminal matters should be pursued as the first policy
for evaluation”.82 However, it is still rather unclear how thesemechanismswill
be developed and whether they will significantly improve the current,
extremely limited, evaluation by the Commission. Certainly, the Commission
80. See Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2009: Acting now for a better
Europe COM(2008)712 final, 9; Commission, Adopted Commission Initiatives 2010, 13
<ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/docs/execution_report_2010.pdf> accessed 29 March
2012.
81. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council:
An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen COM(2009)262; Council, The
Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens
Council doc. 17024/09; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens. Action Plan
Implementing the Stockholm Programme – COM(2010)171. Remarkably, for the first time in
the history of the EU, the Commission’s Action Plan did not satisfy the Council, due to a
number of departures from the Stockholm Programme. For this reason, the Council urged the
Commission “to take only those initiatives that are in full conformity with the Stockholm
Programme” and asked a review by June 2012; Council Conclusions on the Commission
Communication “Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens –
Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme” COM (2010)171 final, 3018th JHA
Council meeting,3 June 2010; see also Monar, op. cit. supra note 13.
82. Council, “The Stockholm Programme”, cited supra note 81, 15.
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may provide further information about this process in its review of theAction
Plan to implement the Stockholm Programme due by June 2012.83
Although the overall context is not particularly favourable for any speedy
alteration of the EU policy in the field of approximation of organized crime
legislation, some elements may spur some change. European institutions and
agencies have shown awareness of the limits of the FD. In addition to the
Commission, which showed its disagreement with the final text of the FD
adopted by the Council, also Eurojust and the European Parliament argued
that the FD is not currently satisfactory in some points. In particular, the
Parliament urged the Commission to consider a thorough revision of the FD
and present a new proposal.
For these reasons, the forthcomingmonthswill be crucial for the destiny not
only of the FD, but also for the whole EU policy in the AFSJ. These passages
may represent a turning point not only in the field of organized crime
legislation, but also for the EU policy of approximation of criminal law (other
measures share the problems of the FD). Eventually, the Council, which has so
far been the major player in the former Third Pillar, may be called to
reconsider its policy. So far, the Council has normally privileged consistency
with previous instruments (Joint Action of 1998) and international treaties
(the UNCTOC) over the introduction of new, more evidence-based, solutions.
The consequences and risks of this approach are now emerging at various
levels. Addressing and solving the critical issues of the FD would require the
Council to radically depart from its previous methods and develop an
autonomous, knowledge-based approach to organized crime legislation. Such
a change is a daunting challenge EU institutions will soon have to face, but it
would surely improve the quality and effectiveness of EU measures, increase
trust and legitimacy levels in a field of particular concern for EU citizens and
will also finally return to the EU the leading role in the field of organized
crime legislation it has held for years.
83. See note 81 supra.
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